Nietzsche's Ethics

The Gay Science has been better than I expected: not only are there copious philosophical gems, but also one begins to gain a better understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy because he introduces all the primary aspects of his philosophy--his morality, his arguments against Christianity and pity, his psychoanalysis, among other things.

Nietzsche is known as an "immoralist", but he most definitely was not, at least not in the general  sense of the term. He was an immoralist because he rejected morality with a capital "M." Anyways, I had to go apply for another social security card early this morning (It really sucked!). Knowing that I had to wait, I brought The Gay Science to read while in line.

This morning I found the following, thereby discovering the ethical maxim fundamental to Nietzsche's morality:

How is it at all possible to keep to one's own way? Constantly, some clamor or other calls us aside; rarely does our eye behold anything that does not require us to drop our own preoccupation instantly to help. I know, there are a hundred decent and praiseworthy ways of losing my own way, and they are truly highly "moral"! Indeed, those who now preach the morality of pity even take the view that precisely this and only this moral--to lose one's own way in order to come to the assistance of a neighbor. I know just as certainly that I only need to expose myself to the sight of some genuine distress and I am lost. And if a suffering friend said to me, "Look, I am about to die; please promise me to die with me,I should promise it; and the sight of a small mountain tribe fighting for its liberty would persuade me to offer it my hand and my life--if for goods reasons I may choose for once two bad examples. All such arousing of pity and calling for help is secretly seductive, for our "own way" is too hard and demanding and to remote from the love and gratitude of others, and we do not really mind escaping from it--and from our very own conscience--to flee into the conscience of the others and into the lovely temple of the "religion of pity."

As soon as any war breaks out anywhere, there also breaks out precisely among the noblest people a pleasure that, to be sure, is kept secret: Rapturously, they throw themselves into the new danger of death because the sacrifice for the fatherland seems to them to offer the long desired permission--to dodge their goal; war offers them a detour to suicide, but a detour with a good conscience. And while I shall keep silent about some points, I do not want to remain silent about my morality which says to me: Live in seclusion so that you can live for yourself. Live in ignorance about what seems most important to your age. Between yourself and today lay the skin of at least three centuries. And the clamor of today, the noise of wars and revolutions should be a mere murmur for you. You will also wish to help--but only those whose distress you understand entirely because they share with you one suffering and one hope--your friends--and only in the manner in which you help yourself. I want to make them bolder, more persevering, simply, gayer. I want to teach them what is understood by so few today, least of all by these preachers of pity: to share not suffering but joy. (I added the bold.)

What is fundamental to his ethic is the fact that one cannot fully understand another's suffering: 'Our personal and profoundest suffering is incomprehensible and inaccessible to almost everyone; here we remain hidden from our neighbor, even if we eat from one pot." The reason pity is horrible is because, at its very essence, "it strips away from the suffering of others whatever is distinctively personal." Those who pity forget "the path to one's own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one's own hell." Ultimately, people pity others for a couple of reasons: (1) They despite all suffering, most importantly their own, (2) they which to be comfortable, and (3) their "own way" is "too hard and demanding and too remote from the love and gratitude of others."

I find Nietzsche's analysis of pity to be quite interesting, but I find some of his assumptions to be troubling. For one, it seems that he implies that everyone's goal is to commit suicide: "the sacrifice for the fatherland seems to them to offer the long desired permission--to dodge their goal; war offers them a detour to suicide, but a detour with a good conscience." I don't know how accurate this assumption is; personally, the people I have met don't seem to make it a goal to kill themselves. However, perhaps he is criticizing the belief in an afterlife because the belief in an afterlife implies a hatred for this life, though to what extent I'm not sure. The belief in an afterlife arise from one's want to commit suicide? I'm not sure.

Secondly, I don't think people lose their way in order to come to the assistance of a neighbor. To say such a thing is to imply that helping others is not a part of one's "way", which, one could argue, is probably an integral, and perhaps rational (as if that matters), part of one's "way." Part of me wonders to what extent Nietzsche's utterly depressing lonliness has influenced this part of his ethics.

Perhaps what rubs me the wrong way the most, is his moral maxim to "live in seclusion so that you can live for yourself." But you can live for yourself and help others at the same time. Seclusion is not necessary for one to live his or her "own way." And, quite frankily, what value is your way if you are only progressing yourself? Where is the honor in such a "way"? 

Despite my brief and rudimentary critique, I agree with Nietzsche that we should help those who's suffering we understand, but only in a manner in which one helps one's self. (When I read this part, Ayn Rand's Objectivism came to mind.) However, I would argue that in most cases, helping another almost always helps yourself whether it be for selfish reasons or not, though this implies that one has a willingness to understand another's suffering.

After thinking about the fundamental ethical maxim in Nietzsche's philosophy, I don't think my ambiguity towards some of the implications of his analysis and assumptions effect its validity. The point of one's morality should be "to share not suffering but joy," because joy should be spread--not suffering. Insofar as pity prevents this, it should be done away with. This I think, is what Nietzsche is really trying to get across.